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THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-v-

, , .,..

Case No. 14148

JOHN HENRY TAYLOR,
Defendant-Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant appeals from three convictions of murder in
the second degree, one conviction of attempted murder in the first
degree, and one conviction of attempted murder in the second degree,
entered against him by jury verdicts in the District Court of Salt Lake
County, Judge Jay E. Banks presiding.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
This was a jury trial in the District Court of Salt Lake
County, Judge Jay E. Banks presiding, on the 28th, 29th, and 30th days
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of April and the 1st, 2nd, and 5th days of May, 1975. On the 5th day of
May, 1975, the jury found the appellant guilty on three counts of murder
in the second degree, one count of attempted murder in the first degree,
and one count of attempted murder in the second degree. On the 14th
day of May, 1975, appellant was sentenced to serve consecutive indeterminate terms of five years to life in the Utah State Prison for each conviction.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant seeks a reversal by this court because (1) the
jury instructions failed to set forth all applicable factual situations of
the crime of manslaughter; (2) because the crime of manslaughter, as
well as the crimes of murder and attempted murder, requires intentional conduct; (3) that the jury instructions setting forth the essential
elements of the crime of manslaughter failed to include the necessary
element of intentional conduct; and (4) because the erroneous instructions for the crime of manslaughter prejudiced the appellant in his conviction of the crimes of murder and attempted murder.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On or about the 29th day of August, 1974, the appellant
awoke realizing he had rent and other bills to pay (Rc 413). To obtain
some money, he put two guns in his truck, intending to sell them in
town (R. 413). Without anything to eat (R. 428), he drove to a bar called
"The Club1' at Fifth West and Second South in Salt Lake City and began
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

drinking a fifth of whiskey at approximately 12:00 o'clock noon (R. 350,
351, 366, 414). He remained at The Club until 10:30 p . m . (R. 433)
during which 10-1/2 hours he consumed approximately two fifths of
whiskey (R. 350, 351, 366), an unascertainable number of 10 ounce
glasses of beer (R. 375), and about ten pills including Valium (R. 352),
Methamphelamine (R. 371), and Secanol (R. 451). Due to the excessive use of alcohol and drugs, the appellant became so intoxicated that
he was slurring his speech (R. 346, 375), staggering while trying to
walk (R. 346, 375), and swearing and using other boisterous language
(R. 345, 377). While sitting at the bar, he even fell off a bar stool
(R. 337).
At 10:30 p . m . the appellant and a friend walked down the
street to another bar called the "Fourth Quarter Lounge" (R. 242).
After ordering a drink at the Fourth Quarter Lounge, the appellant and
a Mr. Boiling engaged in a heated argument (R. 191, 211, 216, 228)
which resulted in Mr. Boiling attacking the appellant and hitting him
over the head with a bar stool (R. 107, 191). In order to prevent the
fight from continuing, the bartender ran from behind the bar and
grabbed the stool from Mr. Boiling (R. 108, 217, 228). Regardless
of the efforts of the bartender, the appellant and Mr. Boiling were still
very angry with each other (R. 109, 254). The appellant's friend
cautioned him to settle down (R. 249). After announcing "I'll see you
all later," the appellant left the Fourth Quarter Lounge.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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When the appellant returned to the Fourth Quarter Lounge

-

twenty to thirty minutes later, he was very upset, angry, and carrying \
a shotgun and a pistol (R* 184, 234, 236). Talking and swearing in an
excitable voice, he said "I'm back." (R. 144, 237). He then approached,
shot, and wounded Mr. Boiling who was holding a pool cue stick (R. 144);
threatened a Mr. Gregg but did not shoot him (Rc 146); shot and killed
a Mr. Hairston while Hairston was reaching for a walking cane (R. 147);
threatened a Mary Robertson who was standing frozen behind the bar but
did not shoot her (R. 149); shot and killed a Mr. Gray when Gray arose
from a chair (R, 150); shot and wounded the bartender who was reaching
for something in a drawer (R. 444); and shot and killed a Mr. Holt when
Holt held a bar stool out in front on himself (R. 151, 200) •
The appellant then left the Fourth Quarter Lounge, climbed
into his truck, and drove away at a high rate of acceleration (R0 152,
263). Arriving home, he drove over the curb, parked his truck on the
front lawn, tripped over the front steps, and fell unconscious on the
living room floor (R. 388, 389). The next morning, the appellant called
the police and told them that he might be the man they were looking for
(R. 301, 304). He remembered having the guns in his hands while at
the Fourth Quarter Lounge (R. 299), but did not remember killing anyone (R. 300, 321), The appellant also testified chat he ordinarily became
angry when intoxicated, especially when physically attacked (R, 438).
As a result of thus incident, charges were brought against
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the appellant and he was tried and convicted of three counts of the
crime of murder in the second degree, one count of the crime of
attempted murder in the first degree, and one count of the crime of
attempted murder in the second degree (R. 597). During trial, the
appellant requested the court to instruct the jury on all applicable
factual situations of the crime of manslaughter included in Utah Code
Ann. § § 76 -5 -205 (1) (a) (b) (c) (1973). The court refused to instruct
on the factual situations of the crime of manslaughter included in
§§ 76-5-205(1) (a) (c) (1973) and instructed only on the factual situation
of the crime of manslaughter included in § 76-5-205 (1) (b) (R. 585, 586,
588, 589, 590). The appellant further requested that the court instruct
the jury that intentional conduct was an essential element of the crime
of manslaughter. The court also refused this request (R. 585, 586,
588, 589, 590).
Refusal of the lower court to instruct the jury as requested
misdirected the jury and prevented it from considering all applicable
factual situations and essential elements of the crime of manslaughter
in arriving at their verdict and constituted reversible e r r o r .
ARGUMENT
POINT I
REFUSAL OF THE LOWER COURT TO INSTRUCT
ON UTAH CODE ANN. § § 76 -5 -205 (1) (a) (c)
CONSTITUTES REVERSIBLE ERROR.
The jury instructions in this case concerning the essential
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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elements of the crime of manslaughter stated:
Before you can convict the defendant
of the crime of criminal homicide,
manslaughter, . . • you must find
from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, all the following elements
of that crime: that on or about the
29th day of August, 1974, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, the defendant,
John Henry Taylor, caused the death
of [deceased] under the influence of
extreme mental or extreme emotional
disturbance for which there is a
reasonable explanation or excuse,
(Instructions 24, 27, 30.)
These instructions are correct in stating one type of conduct which
constitutes the crime of manslaughter, i . e . , when the actor causes the
death of another while under the influence of extreme mental or emotional
disturbance • However, the Utah manslaughter statute makes it clear
that two other types of conduct also constitute the crime of manslaughter.
Utah Code Amu §§ 76-5-205 (1) (a) (b) (c) (1973) defines manslaughter:
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter if the actor:
(a) Recklessly causes the death of
another; or
(b) Causes the death of another under
the influence of extreme mental
or emotional disturbance for
which there is a reasonable
explanation or excuse;
(c) Causes the death of another under
circumstances where the actor
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reasonably believes the circumstances provide a moral or
legal justification or extenuation
for his conduct although the conduct is not legally justifiable or
excusable under the existing
circumstances.
In other words, there are three possible types of conduct
wl lich constitute the crime of 1:1 lanslaughter

f

I he ..lower court ii 1 this

case allowed the jury to consider only one type of conduct in determining
whether' die appellant was guiliy of nianslau^lnu , wl lether he:
(b) Caused the death of another under the
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there
was a reasonable explanation or
excuse. (Utah Code Ann. §76-5 -205
<l)(b)<1973).)
Therefore, the jury was limited in considering whether the appe llai it
committed the crime of manslaughter because of either of the other
two types of conduct which also constitute the crime of manslaughter,
i e , whetl ler tl le appel ianti

••

(a) Recklessly caused the death of
another (Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205
, (l)(a) (1973)); o r
(c) Caused the death of another under
circumstances where the actor
reasonably believed the circumstances provided a moral or legal
justification or extenuation for his
conduct although the conduct was
not legally justifiable or excusable
under the circumstances. (Utah
Code Ann • § 76-5 -205 (l)(c) (1973).)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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From the evidence presented at trial, the jury reasonably
could have concluded the appellant's conduct was reckless and was
within Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205(1) (a) (1973).
The word "recklessly" is defined in § 76-2-103(3) (1973):
A person engages in conduct:
(3) Recklessly, or maliciously, with
respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result
of his conduct when he is aware of
but consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that
the circumstances exist or the
result will occur. The risk must
be of such a nature and degree that
its disregard constitutes a gross
deviation from the standard of care
that an ordinary person would
exercise under all the circumstances
as viewed from the actor's standpoint, (Emphasis added.)

'

Therefore, conduct is reckless when the actor is aware of but consciously
disregards an unjustifiable risk.
The appellant knew he became angy when drunk, especially
after being physically attacked (R, 438) . Therefore, the jury reasonably
could have concluded the appellant was aware of the risk to others he
would create by becoming extremely intoxicated in public with two loaded
guns at his disposal and that he consciously disregarded this risk when he
voluntarily spent 10-1/2 hours drinking whiskey and beer, consuming
drugs, and using deadly weapons in a crowded bar. Therefore, the jury
reasonably could have concluded the appellant was aware of but consciously
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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disregarded c it i in ljustifiable risk and recklessly caused the death of
three others and attempted to cause the death of two others.
The appellant was aware that he had two guns in his hands
when lie returned to the Fourth Quarter Lounge after an altercation in
which he was involved had there taken place (R. 299). With the appellai it being aware of tl le risk created to others by tl le fact that he was
holding deadly weapons while in a state of intoxication and anger, the
-'•y reasonably could I lave coi icluded the appellai it consciously disregarded this risk by proceeding to shoot five people in just a matter
of seconds.
Therefore, the lower court committed prejudicial and
reversible error by refusing to instruct the jury on reckless conduct
as provided for in Utal i Code Am i, § 76-5-205(1 ) (a) (1 973).
The jury reasonably could have concluded also that the
appellant's conduct conformed to that comma included within Utah
Code Ann. § 76-5-205(1) (c) (1973):

. • t --•./•

Causes of death of another under
circumstances where the actor
reasonably believes the circum:
stances provide a moral or legal .
justification or extenuation for his
conduct although the conduct is not
legally justifiable or excusable
under the existing circumstances.

I n c jury reasonably could have concluded the appellant
reasonably believed his conduct was justified nlthougl I it was not

The

appellant had been drinking whiskey and beer, consuming drugs, and
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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had been hit over the head with a bar stool. He returned with two guns
for what under such circumstances he could reasonably have believed to
be self-defense because of threats to his person.
Victim No, 1, the person who had earlier hit him over the
head with a bar stool, was holding a pool cue stick when he was shot.
Victim No. 2 was reaching for a cane when he was shot. Victim No. 3
was shot when he stood up from a chair on which he was previously
sitting. Victim No, 4 was shot while he was reaching for something
from a drawer. Victim No. 5 was shot after he picked up a bar stool.
Although the appellant's conduct would not have been legally
justifiable or excusable under the existing circumstances, the jury
reasonably could have concluded the appellant reasonably believed his
conduct was justifiable because of his mental capacity under the circumstances.
When reasonable minds could differ as to certain facts, the
trial court must instruct the jury on all applicable law relating to those
facts. Reasonable minds could differ as to the facts of this case relative
to all three subsections of the new manslaughter statute. Therefore,
the lower court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on all three subsections of the new manslaughter statute. This reversible error p r e cluded the jury from considering all alternatives upon which it could have
found the appellant guilty of manslaughter rather than murder.
In State v. Newton, 105 Utah 561, 144 P.2d 290 (1943), the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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defendant was convlei. dof involuntary manslaughter upon an nisi met nit
concerning the "right-of-way" statute with respect to traffic regulation.
The trial judge lefused lo Include portions of tl le right-of-way statute in
his instructions to the jury because he felt the portions of the statute
omitted from the instructions were inapplicable considering the evidence
presented• At one point this court said:
If there had been any evidence pro duced by defendant or by any of the
witnesses which might indicate that
the qualifications as to the right-ofway were applicable, the appellant
would have been entitled to an instruction covering that part of the statute
which was omitted from the instruction
in question. 144 P.2d at 292. ~ — —
(Emphasis added.)
In State > v. Greer 1, 78 I Jtali 580, 6 P.2d 177 (1931) aiic 1 State
v. Harris, 1 Utah 2d 182, 264 P.2d 284 (1953), the role of the trial
ji ldge was defined with .respect to that of the jury, rI his court has saiu.
The right of an accused to trial by jury,
• * ••' assured by the provisions of our State
Constitution, means that all issues of
fact shall be submitted to"tEem and that
the Court should neither expressly nor
by implication indicate his opinion upon
the facts or as to the weight of the evidence. 264 P.2d at 286. (Emphasis
added.)
POINT II
I N T E N T I 0 N A L

C 0 N D U C T

Ig A N

E S S E N T I A L

ELEMENT OF THE CRIME OF MANSLAUGHTER.
In Utah prior to 1973, criminal homicide committed under
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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circumstances not amounting to murder was defined as manslaughter.
Manslaughter was divided into two types, voluntary and involuntary
manslaughter.
Utah Code Ann. § 103-28-5 (1933),
§76-30-5(1953), "Manslaughter"
defined: Manslaughter is the unlawful
killing of a human being without malice*
It is of two kinds:
(1) Voluntary, upon a sudden quarrel
or in the heat of passion;
(2) Involuntary, in the commission of
an unlawful act not amounting to a
felony, or in the commission of a
lawful act which might produce
death, in an unlawful manner or
without due caution and circumspection .
A.

Intentional conduct was an essential element
of voluntary manslaughter under Utah Code
Ann. § 76-30-5 (1953).

Prior to 1973, Utah case law concerning voluntary manslaughter made intentional conduct an essential element for this c r i m e /
In State v. Cobo, 90 Utah 89, 60 P.2d 952 (1936), this court reversed the
trial court's finding that an unintentional killing may constitute voluntary
manslaughter:
This statutory definition [§ 103-28-5(1)
(1933)] is but declaratory of the common
law, to constitute voluntary manslaughter
the killing must be willful or intentional,
; or there must exist an intention at least
to do great bodily harm. The intention
may be inferred from the use of a deadly
weapon,, 60 P.2d at 956. (Emphasis added.)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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1

In other words, to convict the
defendant of voluntary manslaughter,
the offense for which the defendant
was convicted, the jury were permitted by the charge to do so without
finding that the killing was either
willful or intentional, thus misdirecting the jury with respect to the
elements of the offense for which the
accused was convicted. 60 P.2d at
959, (Emphasis added.)

The Cobo decision conclusively shows that an essential element of
voluntary manslaughter was an intentional conduct,
A similar case to Cobo was State v. Gallegos, 16 Utah 2d
102, 396 P,2d 414 (1964). There the court held that even though the
word intentional was not used by the trial court in directing the jury on
voluntary manslaughter, the element of intent was adequately included
in the jury instructions for voluntary manslaughter because they did
include the word voluntary. The court concluded:
The word Voluntary1 . . # clearly
requires either that the killing or the
act causing the death be intentional
and not accidental, even though there
was no express definition to that
effect of the word, 'intentionally/
396 P.2d at 416. (Emphasis added.)
It is clear that in Utah prior to 1973, intentional conduct
was an essential element of voluntary manslaughter, Cobo, Gallegos,
supra, even though the word "voluntary" could replace intentionally in
jury instructions due to the similarity of their meanings. Gallegos,
supra.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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If this case had been tried prior to 1973, it is clear from
Cobo and Gallegos, supra, that the trial court would have been required
to instruct the jury that the defendant could be found guilty of voluntary
manslaughter only if he intentionally or voluntarily killed his victim.
B.

Intentional conduct is likewise an
essential element of manslaughter
under Utah Code Ann, §§ 76-5-205(1)
(a)(b)(c)(1973).

Although the words 'Voluntary manslaughter" are not present
in the Utah Code today, it is clear that the culpable mental state required
for the commission of the crime of manslaughter is one of intent.
Utah Code Ann, § 76-5-205(1)(a) (1973) provides that criminal
homicide constitutes the crime of manslaughter if the actor recklessly
causes the death of another. Reckless does not mean negligent because
§ 76-5-206(1) (2) (1973) provides for the crime of negligent homicide as
a class A misdemeanor, and § 76-5-205 (1) (a) and (2) provide for a reckless homicide under the manslaughter statute as a second degree felony.
This implies that reckless conduct requires a more culpable mental state
than does negligent conduct.
A further indication that reckless means intentional under
the 1973 Utah Code is the fact that reckless conduct occurs when the
actor is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable
risk. Webster's New International Dictionary (2d ed. 1954), p . 567
defines conscious as:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

[W]orking with critical awareness
in accompaniment of creative
impulse; deliberate; intentional,
(Emphasis added.)
An awareness and conscious disregard, according to Webster's, would
be an intentional act. And Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(1) (1973) provides:
A person engages in conduct:
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or
willfully with respect to the
nature of his conduct or to a
result of his conduct, when it
is his conscious objective or
desire to engage in the conduct
or cause the result. (Emphasis
added.)
Perhaps the most definite statement of what culpable mental
state is meant by a conscious disregard of an unjustifiable risk is found
in Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Lacy, 78 Kan. 622, 97 P. 1025
(1908), wherein the cour,. said:
. . . True the courts and text-writers
quite generally agree that recklessness
amounting to an utter disregard of
consequences will be held to supply the
place of specific intent. And a reckless
indifference or disregard of the natural
or probable consequences of doing or
omitting to do an act, which is generally
termed wanton negligence, carries with
it the same liability as an injury
inflicted by willfulness. 97 P. at 1028.
(Emphasis addecFT)
According to Lacy, a conscious disregard of consequences
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will be held to supply the place of specific intent or a willful act.
The Second Restatement of Torts gives an adequate definition of reckless disregard of the safety of others. Section 500 states in
pertinent part:
The actor's conduct is in reckless
disregard of the safety of another if he
does an a c t o r intentionally fails to do
an act which it is his duty to the other
to do. • • • (Emphasis added.)
Being aware of an unjustifiable risk is an element of the definition of
recklessness. When an actor is aware of an unjustifiable risk, a plain
duty to act arises* Yet, according to Lacy, supra, and the Second
Restatement of Torts, when the actor consciously disregards his duty
to act when he is aware that such a duty exists, his conduct is intentional.
Therefore, reckless conduct is intentional, and Utah Code Ann. § 76-5205(1) (a) (1973) restates an essential element of the old voluntary manslaughter statute, i . e . , intentional conduct.
Section 76-5-205 (1) (b) provides that criminal homicide
constitutes manslaughter if the actor:
Causes the death of another under the
influence of extreme mental or emotional
disturbance for which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse.
The appellant maintains that this definition likewise contains the essential element of intentional conduct, the same element of intent required
to convict a person of voluntary manslaughter prior to 1973.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Traditionally, voluntary manslaughter consisted of an
intentional homicide committed under extenuating circumstances which
would mitigate the crime from murder to manslaughter. In Utah, one
mitigating circumstance was the fact that when the defendant killed his
victim, he was in a state of passion engendered in him by adequate
provocation, Cobo, supra; People v. Calton, 5 Utah 451, 16 P. 902,
rev'd on Other point in 130 U.S. 83 (1888). Hence, the words "heat of
passion" were employed by Utah and many other states as a term
denoting the heretofore mentioned mitigating circumstance.
The framers of the new 1973 manslaughter statute found
that the words ,fheat of passion" were an inadequate definition of the
modern concepts of this crime, so they substituted an explanation
stating rather what is meant by "heat of passion." This explanation is
currently found in subsection (b) of the new manslaughter statute. The
Model Penal Code, from which subsection (b) was taken verbatim,
gives reasons for the change in wording:
We thus treat on a parity with provocation cases in the classic sense,
situations where the provocative circumstance is something other than
injury inflicted by the deceased on
the actor but nonetheless is an event
° calculated to arouse extreme mental
or emotional disturbance . . . This
is, we think, to state in fair and
realistic terms the criteria by which
men do and should appraise the mitigating import of mental or emotional
distress when it is a factor in so
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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jrave a crime as homicide . . .
T]he offense is murder if the actor
kills purposely or knowingly, unless
there is mental or emotional disturbance deemed to rest on reasonable explanation or excuse within the
meaning of paragraph (1) (b) of this
Section. M.P.C. Tent. Dr. #9,
p . 41, 45. (Emphasis added.)

f

Accordingly, when the actor kills purposely or knowingly in
a condition of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, the crime is
manslaughter, not murder. The essential element of intent to kill has
remained even though the words "heat of passion" have been eliminated
and other words have been substituted in their place.
It is evident that Utah legislators accepted these comments
found in the Model Penal Code as a basis for changing the wording of the
old voluntary manslaughter statute.
The causing of the death of another,
when one is acting under the influence
of extreme mental or emotional dis turbance, for which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse, will cover
situations formerly handled under
voluntary manslaughter in this state.
J. Barney, Utah Criminal Code Outline
and Commentary, p . 174(1973).
(Emphasis added.)
Therefore, subsection (b) of the new manslaughter statute proscribes
intentional conduct.
Subsection (c) of the new manslaughter statute states that
criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter if the actor:
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Causes the death of another under
circumstances where the actor
reasonably believes the circumstances provide a moral or legal
justification or extenuation for his
conduct although the conduct is not
legally justifiable or excusable
under the existing circumstances.

:

This statement found in Utah's manslaughter statute is another extenuating circumstance, in addition to heat of passion, that has been recognized in many jurisdictions as one whose effect is to reduce the crime
of murder to that of voluntary manslaughter. A concise statement
indicating that subsection (c) prohibits only intentional conduct in a
modern manslaughter statute is found in W. LaFave, A. Scott, Criminal Law, p . 583 (1972):
A modern tendency, not yet far
advanced, is to add other extenuating
circumstances in the category of
voluntary manslaughter so as to
include such intentional homicides
as those committed in an imperfect
right of self defense or defense of
others, or of crime prevention, or
of the defense of coercion or necessity, in which the killing, although
not justifiable, is not bad enough to
be murder. (Emphasis added.)
One fact situation which fits nicely with the purview of
subsection (c) is found in the cases of Commonwealth v. Colandro,
231 Pa. 343, 80 A. 571 (1911); Allison v. State, 74 Ark. 444, 86 S.W.
409 (1905); and State v. Thomas, 184 N.C. 757, 114 S.E. 843 (1922).
In each of these cases, the defendant was found guilty of manslaughter,
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not murder, when he intentionally killed the deceased believing that it
was necessary to protect himself but when the circumstances did not
justify the killing. The facts of the present case are strikingly similar
to those presented in Colandro, Allison, and Thomas, supra. The
appellant in the present case was provoked by being hit over the head
with a bar stool and thereafter he retaliated by shooting the person who
provoked him along with others who had not. Even though the jury found
that the appellant was aware of his actions and his conduct was intentional,
Colandro, Allison, and Thomas, supra, would make his crime manslaughter, not murder.

Likewise, subsection (c) of the new manslaughter

statute contemplates that the intentional conduct of appellant in the present
case constitutes manslaughter, not murder.
At least one state has included the substance of subsection (c)
of the new manslaughter statute in its voluntary manslaughter statute
making it clear that the circumstances explained therein are within the
• purview of voluntary manslaughter, an intentional homicide, rather than
a negligent homicide- 111. Ann. Stat. ch. 38 § 9-2 (1969) states in pertinent part:
(b) A person who intentionally or
knowingly kills an individual
commits voluntary manslaughter
if at the time of the killing he
believes the circumstances to be
such that, if they existed, would
justify or exonerate the killing
under the principles stated in
Article 7 of this Code [Self-defense]
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but his belief is unreasonable. (Emphasis added.)
In Illinois, the type of conduct found in subsection (c) of the new Utah
manslaughter statute constitutes the intentional crime of voluntary
manslaughter. Therefore, the type of conduct found in subsection (c)
of the new manslaughter statute constitutes an intentional homicide in
Utah,
C.

Refusal of trial judge to instruct
intentional conduct was an essential
element of the crime of manslaughter
was reversible e r r o r .

\
j

Intentional conduct is an essential element for the commis sion of the crime of manslaughter under Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-205
(1) (a) (b) (c) (1973). Prior to 1973, intentional conduct was also an
essential element of the crime of voluntary manslaughter. Cobo,
Gallegos, supra. Therefore, when the trial judge refused to instruct
that intentional conduct was an essential element of manslaughter, this
constituted a reversible e r r o r . Cobo, supra.
Recent case law in other jurisdictions would also warrant
a reversal of the appellant's conviction on the ground that the lower
court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that intent was an essential
element for a conviction of a conscious wrongdoing. In State v. Cutnose,
532 P.2d 896, cert, denied, 532 P.2d 888 (N.M. App. 1974), the
defendant was convicted for aggravated assault contrary to New Mexico
law. Although not mentioned in the statutes that defined aggravated
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assault, the mental state required to violate them was that of a conscious
wrongdoing. The trial court failed to instruct the jury of the intent
required to warrant a conviction of aggravated assault. In reversing the
conviction, the court said:
If the statute sets forth the required
intent, instructions in the language
of the statute are sufficient0 State v.
Gonzales, 86 N.M. 556, 525 P.2d 916
(ct. App. 1974). However, the language of § 40A-3-2(A), supra, was
insufficient to inform the jury that
conscious wrongdoing was a required
element . 0 . Because the jury was not
instructed on the required criminal
intent, the convictions for violations
of § 40A-3-2(A) and 40A-22-21 (a)(1),
supra, are reversed. 525 P.2d at 899.
(Emphasis added.)
In State v. Clingerman, 213 Kan. 525, 516 P.2d 1022 (1973),
Instruction No. 11 concerned felonious intent while Instruction No. 4
explained the essential elements of robbery but omitted the element of
intent. The Kansas Supreme Court, in reversing the defendant's conviction for robbery, said:
The elements of intent required
for
various statutory crimes vary according to the particular crime. Where
intent is a required element of the
crime it must be included in the charge
and in the instructions of the court
covering the separate elements of that
particular crime. 516 P.2d at 1026.

:

The lower court's refusal to include intent as an essential
element of the crime of manslaughter constituted reversible e r r o r .
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POINT III
REFUSAL OF TRIAL JUDGE TO PROPERLY
INSTRUCT ON CRIME OF MANSLAUGHTER
WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN APPELLANT
WAS CONVICTED OF CRIMES OF MURDER
AND ATTEMPTED MURDER.
i This court held, in the cases of Gallegos, supra, and State
v. Valdez, 30 Utah 2d 54, 513 P02d 424 (1973):
[l]t is generally held, under ordinary
factual situatloris that where a jury
finds the defendant guilty of a greater
offense, the giving or an erroneous
instruction of a lesser offense is not
prejudicial, 513 P.2d 424. (Emphasis
added.)
In Valdez, this court relied on 41 CcJ.S. Homicide § 427c(2), p . 297
as authority for its position. It is essential that the court recognize
the totality of the general rule just stated because included in 41 C.J.S.
Homicide § 427c (2), p . 298, the same section of Corpus Juris Secundum
quoted in Valdez as the authority for this ruling, the general rule continues:
However, where the evidence authorizes and requires the giving of an
Instruction on manslaughter, the giving
of an erroneous instruction on that
offense constitutes prejudicial and
reversible error on a conviction of
murder, (Emphasis added.)
In this case, the evidence required the giving of an instruction on manslaughter. A manslaughter instruction was indeed given,
but it was erroneous in that it failed to include all conduct which
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constitutes the crime of manslaughter* It further failed in omitting the
essential element of intentional conduct. Because of erroneous instructions on the crime of manslaughter, the jury was misdirected in believing
that it could not find the appellant guilty of the crime of manslaughter if
it felt that his conduct was intentional or that of the unlawful acts found
in subsections (a) and (c) of the new manslaughter statute.
In this case, the giving of erroneous instructions on the
crime of manslaughter constituted prejudicial and reversible error on
the appellant's convictions of murder and attempted murder.
CONCLUSION
From the evidence presented at trial, reasonable minds
could have differed whether the appellant had violated subsections (a)
and (c) of the new manslaughter statute. The lower court's refusal to
include these subsections in its instructions indicated to the jury that
the evidence did not warrant a finding that they applied to appellant's
conduct. Thus, the lower court erroneously decided an issue of fact
which should have gone to the jury with proper instructions, and in so
doing the lower court committed reversible e r r o r . Newton, Green,
Harris, supra.

;?•

The instructions concerning manslaughter prejudiced the
jury into believing that if they found that the appellant's conduct was
intentional, they could only find him guilty of murder and not manslaughter. It is well established in Utah law that manslaughter is an
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intentional homicide, and any instruction directing the jury to think
otherwise constitutes a reversible e r r o r . Cobo, Gallegos, supra.
The appellant urges this court to follow the general rule that the giving
of an erroneous manslaughter instruction constitutes a prejudicial and
reversible error in the conviction of murder or attempted murder.
41 C.J.S. Homicide § 427c(2).
The appellant's convictions should be reversed, and this
case should be remanded for a new trial with proper instructions.
DATED this

\ cVicfTT~"day of November, 1975.
Respectfully submitted,
PHIL L . HANSEN AND ASSOCIATES
250 East Broadway, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellant

" I • M-^L'J
Phil L. Hansen
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